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IX.  REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION:
PRIORITIES FOR POLICY MAKERS AND
FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS
By Allan N. Rae
A.  Overview of the regional studies
The preceding chapters amply demonstrate that regional trade arrangements and
ongoing negotiations over new BTAs and RTAs are numerous in the Asia-Pacific region.
In  South Asia,  SAPTA/SAFTA  is  the  most  extensive,  bringing  together  seven  regional
economies (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka).  However,
some of these countries also have bilateral trade agreements among themselves – including
India-Sri Lanka (the India-Lanka FTA), Sri Lanka – Pakistan, India – Bhutan, India – Nepal
and India – Bangladesh.  Some are also members of trade agreements with other Asian
countries outside of South Asia, such as:
(a) APTA, which brings Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka together with the Republic
of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and China;
(b) The Thailand – Bangladesh preferential trade agreement; and
(c) The economic cooperation between Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka with
Thailand and Myanmar (BIMSTEC).
South  Asian  countries  are  also  involved  in  negotiating  or  studying  additional
agreements with economies within Asia and beyond.
Preferential trade agreements in East Asia and South-East Asia are much more
numerous, which is perhaps not surprising given the number of countries in this region.
Chapter  III  lists  20  agreements  in  force,  26  under  negotiation  and  another  29  under
study.  Of those in force at the time of writing, seven of the completed agreements were
solely between East Asian or South-East Asian economies.  Of those economies, Singapore
is included in most agreements, with 11 in force and another 18 under negotiation or study.
The Republic of Korea is also active, with three agreements in force (one with Singapore
and the other two with non-Asian partners) and 14 under negotiation or study.  By far the
most extensive in terms of the number of partner countries is AFTA (comprising the 10
ASEAN members), which is seeking further broadening through negotiations or studies
underway with another three Asian countries (Republic of Korea, India and Japan) as well
as the United States, Australia and New Zealand (CER) and the European Union.
The  South  Asian  economies  have  experienced  favourable  economic  growth  in
recent years, but this has not always been experienced within their agricultural sectors.  In
some countries of the region, rural poverty and income inequality have worsened and are296
major issues given the high share of rural residents in the total population.  Despite the
geographic proximity of the South Asian economies, agricultural competitiveness shows
some variation across countries, suggesting scope for trade expansion under liberalized
regional trade policies; however, up to the present, intraregional trade has accounted for
advantage was shown to be relatively strong for fish in Maldives and Bangladesh, tea, and
spices in Sri Lanka and India, and cereals and sugar in Pakistan and India.
Following completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations (all except Bhutan are
WTO members) these countries bound agricultural tariffs at generally high levels, although
applied rates are often much lower.  On average, Bangladesh and India face lower agricultural
tariffs for their exports to the South Asian region than the tariffs they impose on other
South Asian imports, which is a broad indication of scope for gains from further regional
cooperation.  Of the South Asian economies, Maldives and Sri Lanka were shown to be
the  most  open  to  agricultural  trade  and  India  the  least  open.    Considerable  economic
liberalization has taken place in the region, including the agricultural sector.  Nevertheless,
high agricultural bound tariffs remain, together with para-tariffs, quantitative restrictions on
agricultural trade and state import monopolies in some countries.  Domestic support, such
as input and other subsidies, is also provided to farmers – the levels of which vary across
the region and are relatively higher in India than elsewhere – and in some cases, export
subsidies are used.
SAPTA
1  includes  a  number  of  agricultural  products offering  concessions  to  the
member countries.  However, many of the agricultural tariff preferences offered under this
agreement were said to be irrelevant to the member countries, with the real interests of
such countries being subject to sensitive listings.  The agreement also provides for technical
assistance and special concessions to its least developed members.  Member countries
have agreed to implement the agreement by various dates, with the process to be completed
by  2015.    Analysis  has  shown  that,  so  far,  it  has  had  a  significant  agricultural  trade
creation effect.  The other intra-/interregional and bilateral trade agreements of the South
Asian  economies  have  included  very  few  additional  agricultural  products  for  further
liberalization.    Some  of  the  bilateral  agreements  take  similar  approaches  to  product
coverage and rules of origin; they may classify agricultural products as “sensitive” or use
tariff rate quotas to allow limited imports at concessional or zero rates.  The India-Lanka
agreement, which has encouraged quite rapid growth in bilateral agricultural trade, has
less  stringent  rules  of  origin  than  does  SAPTA.    The  interregional  agreements  do  not
include a significant number of agricultural concessions.  It should also be noted that the
domestic support and export subsidy policies of some countries in the region, together
with the activities of state trading enterprises, have not been explicitly addressed in any of
the agreements, in contrast to efforts in multilateral trade negotiations.
1 SAPTA, which was superseded by the implementation of SAFTA, was to have begun in 2006.
However,  some  problems  remain  that  are  related  to  the  extension  of  MFN  treatment  of  India  by
Pakistan, and SAFTA therefore has not yet been fully implemented.
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Turning to South-East Asia and East Asia, agriculture is also found to be a sensitive
issue in bilateral and regional trade negotiations.  Many of the agreements in place exhibit
sensitive subsectors within agriculture that are either permanently or temporarily excluded,
or contain liberal extension times for transition and subsequent adjustment.  Nevertheless,
some  successes  have  been  achieved  in  liberalizing  agricultural  trading  conditions.    Of
particular note is the ASEAN approach to incorporating agricultural products within the
scope of AFTA preferences.  This agreement initially excluded unprocessed agricultural
products from tariff concessions, but they were gradually incorporated through the use of
temporary exclusion lists and sensitive lists.  The time frame for moving such products
from  exclusion  and  sensitive  lists  to  the  inclusion  list  differs  among ASEAN  members,
recognizing their particular concerns and stages of development.
Likewise, final concessionary tariff rates also can vary among member countries.
At the time of writing, only a handful of unprocessed agricultural products remain on the
sensitive list while any that have not already been liberalized are on track for eventual
liberalization.  As a result, average agricultural concessionary tariffs of ASEAN countries
are well below MFN rates, and the dispersion of concessionary tariffs is also less than that
of MFN rates.  Perhaps because of the similarity of agricultural commodities produced in
the ASEAN region, or because agricultural products were included relatively recently in the
AFTA agreement, there has not as yet been a marked increase in intra-ASEAN agricultural
trade that might be attributed to that agreement.  The AFTA process of stepwise tariff
reductions, phased transitions and other flexible arrangements illustrates how AFTA intends
to eventually achieve agricultural trade reforms that were earlier thought impossible.  It
could constitute a model to be adopted elsewhere in order to influence the political economy,
where it currently favours agricultural protectionism, towards a more liberal stance.
Also of note is the way in which agriculture was handled in the China – ASEAN
agreement.    Through  its  the  Early  Harvest  Programme,  most  ASEAN  countries  have
included nearly all agricultural tariff lines for accelerated tariff reduction.  Reciprocity requires
that China exactly matches the concessions for the same products.  These ASEAN economies
appear eager, therefore, to engage in more open agricultural trading with China and are
prepared to permit Chinese access to their own markets in order to experience improved
access to China’s market.  The Republic of Korea – Chile agreement also provides wide
coverage  of  agricultural  liberalization  despite  strong  opposition  from  Korean  farmers,
although some products are subject to tariff rate quotas, exclusions lists and other lists of
products that are to be negotiated once the Doha negotiations have been completed.
China is a relative latecomer to regional trade agreements.  In force are the 2003
agreement with ASEAN and the 2004 agreements with Hong Kong, China, and Macao,
China.  However, China is negotiating or studying trade agreements with Australia, Chile,
India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore.  China is a major
producer and consumer of agricultural products and is becoming an increasingly important
international trader of some of these products.  The economic reforms of the 1980s and
1990s contributed to this process and, more recently, to the lowering of China’s own trade
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that impede the international trade of China (and many other countries covered in this
study), China’s potential gains from bilateral and regional trade agreements are currently
restricted by its policy on grains self-sufficiency.  Earlier quotas and now a price support
system  encourage  grain  production  and  thus  discourage  the  shift  of  land  use  towards
more labour-intensive activities, such as fruit and vegetable cultivation and livestock raising,
in which China arguably has a comparative advantage.
One of the results of the Early Harvest Programme of the China – ASEAN free
trade agreement is that China is taking market share for horticultural products away from
ASEAN’s  traditional  suppliers.    Between  2002  and  2005,  China’s  share  of  ASEAN’s
horticultural imports rose from 31 per cent to 38 per cent while that of the United States,
Australia  and  New  Zealand,  for  example,  declined  from  28  per  cent  to  20  per  cent.
However, China also has a comparative advantage relative to ASEAN in non-rice grain
production, and this FTA could move against the imperative for China to reallocate land for
horticultural and other labour-intensive farming activities.
Using an applied global general equilibrium model, potential gains from various
bilateral and regional trade agreements are quantified and presented in chapter IV of this
publication.  Only agricultural tariffs have been eliminated in these studies.  Therefore,
they are valuable in that they are indicative of the gains that might be realized should
member countries choose to extend preferences to all agricultural trade, including sensitive
products such as rice.  Before summarizing some of the main findings and implications of
that work, a number of points need to be borne in mind.  Only agricultural tariffs have been
reduced in these analyses, so any existing domestic subsidies to agriculture, or agricultural
export subsidies, remain untouched.  Tariffs were completely eliminated by the member
countries for all agricultural products – no sensitive or excluded products were recognized.
The results provide a snapshot of outcomes at some time in the future when all those
tariffs will have been eliminated by all parties to the agreement; implications of the timing
of tariff reductions across products and countries, the resulting adjustment costs or the
competitive and productivity gains often associated with freer trade have not been addressed.
The studies recognize non-agricultural tariff preferences within existing agreements only to
the extent that they were reflected in the 2001 base year database that was employed.
(They are not recognized at all in hypothetical regional agreements analysed.) However,
these non-agricultural preferences may have impacts on the agricultural sector; expansion
or  contraction  of  manufacturing  sectors  will  have  an  impact  on  wages  and  resources
available to the primary sector while changes in manufactured prices will affect the costs
of agricultural activities that use such products (chemicals, machinery etc.).  Finally, the
analyses assume that trade will respond to tariff elimination – that is, there is no friction in
trading channels, such as that due to non-tariff barriers, which will prevent agents responding
to changes in price signals.
The analyses proceeded by first simulating an assumed Doha outcome, and then
explored the additional welfare gains or losses from a range of regional trade agreements.
Some were based on actual agreements such as SAFTA, AFTA and the India – Lanka
agreement while others considered the addition of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea299
and India to AFTA as well a wider grouping involving most ESCAP economies.  Some of
the conclusions arising from this work are detailed below.
For smaller bilateral agreements such as SAFTA, and also for AFTA, the gains to
member  countries  tend  to  be  small  and  much  less  than  might  be  enjoyed  following
a  successful  Doha  outcome,  perhaps  due  to  the  similarity  of  their  agricultural  sectors.
Within each agreement, the larger countries and/or those with a comparative advantage in
agriculture (India and Pakistan, Thailand) gain the most from a regional agreement being
extended to include agriculture.  Agriculture is heavily protected in Japan and the Republic
of Korea, so when these countries are added to the ASEAN – China trade agreement and
agricultural tariffs are eliminated, they may be expected to dominate in terms of welfare
gains.  This is also the case, although with smaller gains, for China and most ASEAN
economies.  Viet Nam is shown to gain from agricultural liberalization within AFTA, but not
in the extended AFTA, suggesting that this country may be competitive relative to other
ASEAN countries but not with respect to China.
All members of this expanded AFTA agreement benefit from the addition of India,
which is also currently very protective of its agriculture.  It also appears that India stands to
gain  more  by  linking  up  with ASEAN  and  the  North Asian  economies,  than  with  other
South Asian partners.  In most of these analyses, moderate trade diversion was found to
occur.  This appeared to be a greater problem with a Thailand – Japan agreement, since
Japan’s agricultural imports could be diverted from other competitive suppliers such as
some in South-East Asia.  Should all the Asia-Pacific economies (with the exception of the
United States) come together in a pan-Pacific agreement, all members with the exception
of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are shown to gain from including agriculture.  In fact, in
many  cases,  the  gains  are  larger  than  those  resulting  from  participation  in  regional
agreements involving fewer countries.  A major conclusion is that the larger the group, and
the more diverse the group in terms of both developed and developing country representation
and  economic  structures,  the  larger  the  aggregate  welfare  gains  from  the  inclusion  of
agriculture – with no exceptions – in regional agreements are likely to be.
B.  Future shape of regionalism in Asia
Quantitative  research  conducted  during  this  study  and  by  others  (for  example,
Gilbert,  Scollay  and  Bora,  2001;  Scollay  and  Gilbert,  2001)  shows  that  larger  regional
trade groupings in Asia are economically preferable to a spaghetti bowl of smaller and
bilateral groupings.  Scollay and Gilbert (2001) demonstrated that an Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC)-wide agreement combined with “open regionalism”, an APEC preferential
trade  agreement,  and  a  Western  Pacific  grouping  are  all  preferable  to  other  possible
arrangements in the Asian region, with aggregate economic benefits declining in that same
order.  The superiority of the “open regionalism” approach is that preferences are also
extended to non-members.  This has the advantage of greatly simplifying administration
procedures (for example, rules of origin would not be required), and trade diversion costs
would  not  exist.    A  question  is  whether  current  efforts  are  likely  to  lead  to  such  an
expanded group.300
As a continuing proliferation of smaller groupings and bilateral agreements would
impose costs on non-members through trade diversion, this fact encouraged Gilbert, Scollay
and Bora (2001) to wonder whether such costs would lead to friction within wider political
forums such as APEC, or encourage non-members to actively pursue wider arrangements.
While negotiating within smaller groupings might offer the path of least resistance from
a political point of view, trade friction could result with non-members that might well add to
political friction.  In addition, when countries are involved in negotiations over a larger
number of smaller groupings, scarce negotiating resources are absorbed that could be
directed in other directions that offer greater economic gains.
The  history  of  smaller  bilateral  or  regional  agreements  within  Asia,  and  the
successive  addition  of  new  members  may  be  viewed  positively  (Levy,  2006)  as  taking
smaller steps forward is often politically easier (for example, adjustment costs may be
less) while at the same time creating a certain momentum for regional integration.  This
process  of  progressive  expansion  and  the  potential  amalgamation  of  smaller  regional
groups may also assist in sensitizing entrenched domestic interests and lobby groups to
the benefits of liberalization and, therefore, the erosion of vested interests.  This process
might also provide what Levy called an “incubator” to enable domestic firms to adjust to
new competitive pressures and learn to trade regionally without being abruptly exposed to
fuller international competition.
From  an  Asian  perspective,  Scollay  and  Gilbert  (2001)  demonstrated  that  the
progressive expansion of groups generally benefited new as well as existing members,
and that amalgamation of groups generally benefited the members of the groups being
merged.  There is encouraging evidence that Asian economies are moving in that direction,
especially involving the regional powerhouses of Japan and China.  ASEAN has expanded
to embrace China, is in negotiations with the Republic of Korea and India, and is conducting
studies with Japan and Australia – New Zealand (CER).  In addition, of course, there is
much bilateral activity involving, among others, individual ASEAN countries, North-East
Asian  economies,  India,  Pakistan,  Australia  and  New  Zealand.    Eventually,  should
ASEAN – China link up with CER, a Japan – Republic of Korea BTA and SAPTA, the
gradual process will have resulted in the wider Asia grouping.  Obviously, many impediments
stand in the way of such an achievement, including the vexing issue of agricultural reforms.
Some  priorities  for  easing  or  removing  these  barriers  and  facilitating  progress  are
discussed below.
C.  Priorities for policymakers
The  formation,  extension  and  subsequent  amalgamation  of  regional  trade
agreements can be facilitated through the harmonization of approaches in a number of
areas as well as the adoption of what Harrigan (2006) referred to as “good practices”.
2
2 These include product coverage, rules of origin, customs procedures, intellectual property protection,
foreign direct investment, anti-dumping and dispute resolution, government procurement, competition
and technical barriers to trade.301
Implementation  of  WTO  procedures  (for  example,  those  of  the  safeguards,  SPS, TBT,
rules of origin, trade facilitation and agricultural agreements) as well as various international
standards will contribute to the harmonization of regional rules as well as with the rules of
the multilateral system.  Because regional agreements involve relatively few members, it
may be possible to achieve deeper integration than is afforded by multilateral agreements.
The trade agreements in effect in Asia currently vary widely, as discussed in the
previous chapters of this publication.  They can differ, for example, in terms of product
coverage (contents of positive, negative and exclusion lists), the depth of preferences,
timelines, their use of non-tariff barriers such as tariff rate quotas and safeguards, and
varying and complex rules of origin, SPS and TBT rules, all of which can be reflective of
underlying protectionism.
1.  Product coverage and preferences
The  agreements  studied  here  vary  widely  in  terms  of  their  agricultural  product
coverage, ranging from quite comprehensive coverage in some cases to very restrictive
coverage in others.  There is some evidence that sensitive sectors can be addressed in
regional agreements, albeit sometimes with long transitional periods and further progress
an obvious priority in existing as well as new agreements.  Wider coverage of agricultural
products,  using  negative  rather  than  positive  lists  and  with  less  diversity  of  excluded
products across agreements, should also assist in the harmonization of agreements and
their possible amalgamation.
AFTA provides an example of a step-by-step approach to agricultural inclusivity,
defining temporary exclusion, sensitive and highly sensitive product lists.  These products
are  being  liberalized  according  to  an  agreed  timetable  and  end-of-period  tariffs.    As
a result, very few agricultural products are excluded from the common preferential tariff
scheme, a degree of liberalization not considered possible a decade ago.
The Early Harvest Programme of the China – ASEAN agreement is another notable
example of where substantial agricultural coverage has been negotiated – several ASEAN
countries including Thailand have not excluded any products and, because of reciprocity,
China  will  exactly  match  those  concessions.    Selected  use  of  safeguard  mechanisms,
which could be harmonized if based on WTO safeguard rules and tariff rate quotas, may
also  ease  problems  associated  with  the  inclusion  of  sensitive  products  if  applied  over
a strictly transitional period.
Where current applied tariffs and preferences for any product differ widely between
members and potential new members, or between agreements, reaching a harmonized set
is no easy task.  Nevertheless, solutions have been found within existing agreements that
can be applied to wider amalgamations.  These include different treatment of each country
by stage of economic development, transitional safeguards (whose application may be
restricted to least developed members) and, if meaningful progress is to be made in some
cases, recognition of some countries’ unique strategic or social objectives when attempting
to harmonize negative lists.302
2.  Rules of origin
Rules of origin are used in regional trade agreements to determine eligibility for
preferential treatment.  They raise important issues in the trading of agricultural products,
for example, because processed foods may combine raw materials from several countries.
For agricultural products, the country of origin may be determined in terms of whether or
not the product was wholly produced in the exporting country (especially applicable to raw
agricultural materials), by a process criterion (substantial transformation) or the percentage
of  product  content  or  value-added.    Documentary  evidence  is  usually  required  by  the
importer, and sometimes traceability.  Problems arise when a country belongs to two or
more  regional  agreements  and  the  applicable  rules  are  determined  by  the  intended
destination of trade.  This complexity adds to compliance costs, which are exacerbated
when the rules are not especially transparent, and the increased costs may be perceived
by the exporter as outweighing the value of the preferences.
Rules of origin may lead to inefficiencies in production, when imported raw materials
(such as for processed foods) are diverted from the lowest-cost supplier in order to help
meet origin rules and therefore have the potential to discourage external sourcing.  Regulations
that do not permit cumulation, or permit only partial cumulation, will have a similar effect
when  they  discourage  purchases  of  inputs  from  low-cost  countries  within  the  regional
agreement.  Rules of origin may be more stringent for sensitive products, and may provide
a mechanism for increasing protection levels through their use as trade policy instruments.
An earlier chapter in this book concludes that the low utilization by some Asian
developing  countries  of  duty-free  agricultural  preferential  access  could  well  be  due  to
problems associated with rules of origin.  A priority is to amend the rules in order to allow
the preferences written into regional trade agreements to be more fully realized.  This
requires that:
(a) Attention  is  given  to  opportunities  for  harmonization  and  simplification  of
content requirements;
(b) The rules are symmetrical between importer and exporter;
(c) Rules  of  origin  are  set  with  recognition  of  the  processing  and  technical
capacity of exporters, and without reference to the political sensitivity of the
product concerned;
(d) Certification and administration procedures are simplified, and extension of
cumulation covers all members of the regional agreement.
Bonapace and Mikic (2005) describe how the proliferation of trade agreements is
“spinning a complex RoO web” and its trade deflecting or restricting effects.  They draw
attention to APTA’s rules of origin, which are simple, general and liberal, with a flat rate of
45% of local value content, reduced to 35% for LDCs.
Harrigan and others (2006) go further by suggesting that all Asian bilateral and
regional trade agreements allow cumulation across the Asian region to avoid the prospect303
of  discouraging  efficient  production  networks  that  might  raise  trade  costs  rather  than
lowering them.  Such an approach to cumulation would also assist in the enlargement and
eventual  amalgamation  of  regional  agreements.    Exporters  could  be  offered  a  choice
between alternative rules – an equivalence approach – such as maximum non-originating
value or minimum originating value, since the costs of applying different rules may not be
the  same.    Special  and  differential  treatment  might  also  be  considered  by  applying
different rules to the least developed members of the trade agreement in order to allow
them  to  take  better  advantage  of  tariff  preferences.    Should  WTO  eventually  adopt
a harmonized set of rules of origin, countries within regional trade agreements could be
encouraged to apply them in their own rule-making in order to assist in achieving harmonized
rules, both within and between preferential trade agreements.
3.  SPS and TBT regulations
Progress  on  regional  harmonization  of  SPS  issues  is  found  in  some  of  the
agreements.  Adherence to the WTO SPS (and TBT) agreements and international standards
should  encourage  a  harmonized  approach  to  these  issues  within  and  across  regions,
hence facilitating expansion and future amalgamation of agreements.  It will also contribute
to harmonization with the multilateral system, and will contribute to reducing related frictions
in internal trade.  Thus, in the case of products imported from other member countries:
(a) Treatment should be no less favourably than domestic products;
(b) Food safety and health regulations should be based on scientific principles
and risk assessments;
(c) Regulations  should  not  deliberately  create  obstacles  to  trade  between
member countries, should be no more restrictive than necessary to achieve
their objectives, and should be based on international standards where they
exist to encourage harmonization;
(d) Equivalence should apply, and information on regulations and standards should
be transparent.
Some progress in these aims is reflected in the various regional trade agreements
to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent.   AFTA,  for  example,  makes  provision  for  harmonization,
equivalence, mutual recognition and technical cooperation in respect of SPS measures
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004).  Chapter VIII, however,
notes that of the many non-tariff measures in the ASEAN economies, a large proportion
are applied to agricultural products, especially in the form of technical measures or health
and safety standards.  In other cases, there is more to be done in terms of facilitating the
application of the SPS provisions of the agreements, in monitoring compliance, and in
assisting the development of SPS regulations and inspection procedures among member
countries that do not have well-developed regulatory regimes.  Developed country partners,
in  particular,  can  and  do  provide  assistance  in  these  areas,  perhaps  as  part  of  SDT
components of regional agreements.  Although in some cases such assistance may be
provided initially to facilitate imports from foreign-based subsidiaries, they serve as examples304
of what can be done; the institutions and processes so created may be generally available,
or may serve as models of good practice for all traders.
4.  Domestic agricultural policies
Domestic policies that provide assistance to farmers, such as price support, subsidies
on farm inputs or transport and marketing activities – together with the use of state trading
monopolies in exporting or importing, and export subsidies – are utilized by some Asian
economies.  The levels of protection of agriculture in Japan and the Republic of Korea are
among the highest in the world, although there has been some decline in those levels
since the mid-1980s (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005).
There is also evidence that the level of protection is rising in some of the developing Asian
countries,  or  at  least  becoming  less  negative.    Despite  recent  agricultural  reforms,
Indonesia’s agriculture sector has been protected during the past 20 years, with an increase
in protection in recent years of some commodities including rice and sugar (Thomas and
Orden, 2004).  In Viet Nam, most agriculture was effectively taxed up until the mid-1990s;
since  then,  however,  rice,  sugar  and  the  agricultural  sector  in  aggregate  have  been
increasingly protected (Nguyen and Grote, 2004).  In China, a trend increase in protection
is  evident,  while  in  India  support  is  largely  counter-cyclical  and  exhibited  liberalization
during the 1990s and protection more recently with increased importance placed on input
subsidies (Mullen and others, 2004 and 2005).  Although the levels of protection in South
Asia or South-East Asia have not reached the scale of protection in North-East Asia, the
trend towards increasing protection bears some resemblance to similar trends that occurred
in Taiwan Province of China, the Republic of Korea and Japan earlier in the twentieth
century  (Anderson  and  Hayami,  1986)  that  led  to  the  high  level  of  protection  that  is
observed today.
Domestic  assistance  programmes  may  cause  friction  in  trade  among  member
countries of a trade agreement through a perception of unfair competition, and may distort
intraregional  trade.    In  addition,  the  use  of  domestic  support  policies  can  reduce  the
potential gains from formation of a trade agreement.  Where such support involves the use
of administered output price schemes, or subsidies on tradeable inputs, the price changes
signalled through tariff reductions may not be transmitted to producers; as a result, the
efficient reallocation of resources will be impeded.  The corollary to this has been observed
in NAFTA (Burfisher and others, 1998), where domestic policy changes in the member
countries  have  allowed  the  strengthening  of  market  signals  and  increased  farmers’
responsiveness to changing prices that were the result of NAFTA implementation.  In fact,
domestic policy changes were found to have had a greater impact on the region’s agriculture
than did NAFTA.  By encouraging greater specialization within each country, the changes
also enhanced the trade creation effect, and diminished trade diversion caused by formation
of the regional agreement.  The quantitative work of Burfisher and others illustrated that
NAFTA provided greater welfare gains under the new farm policies than under the old
ones.  If these results could be replicated in Asia, they would provide sound reasons for
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Yet  none  of  the  agreements  discussed  in  the  previous  chapters  or  in  RTAs  in
general (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004) address domestic
support.  An obvious reason is that domestic subsidies cannot be reduced preferentially,
as production for internal trade is generally not separable from other farm production.  For
such commodities that might be primarily destined for intraregional markets, or for products
that are intensively traded at the regional level, the trade distortive effects of domestic
support could be addressed, and more deeply than is achieved through the WTO process.
Caution would have to be exercised in order to ensure that such subsidy cuts were not
reapplied to other farm products.  At the least, arrangements could be considered that
mandate  consultation  when  domestic  subsidies  are  considered  to  be  affecting  internal
trade.    Export  subsidies  (either  explicit  or  implicit)  are  sometimes  also  not  included  in
regional trade agreements, although unlike domestic subsidies, export incentives can be
reduced or eliminated preferentially.  Within Asia, they are not mentioned in the AFTA,
ASEAN – China or Republic of Korea – Chile agreements; however, export subsidies are
not  permitted  under  the  New  Zealand-Singapore  bilateral  agreement  (Organisation  for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004).  They are also not addressed in the
South Asia  trade  agreements.    Other  non-Asian  trade  agreements  may  prohibit  export
subsidies on internal trade, or (as in NAFTA) they may allow such subsidies to be applied
on internal trade if the importing country agrees to them, or the importer is benefiting from
subsidies from other countries.
5.  Trade facilitation
Trade  facilitation  is  the  simplification  and  harmonization  of  international  trade
procedures, and the topic is clearly relevant to agricultural products, especially perishable
items.  Inefficiencies in border procedures and within handling and transport systems can
result  in  opportunities  created  through  the  formation  of  regional  trade  agreements  not
being fully realized.  The design and efficient implementation of trade facilitation measures
throughout the Asian region is a priority if the potential benefits of increased trade flows
and opportunities, lower trade transaction costs, increased government tariff revenues and
encouragement  of  FDI  are  to  be  fully  realized.    The  costs  that  result  from  poor  trade
facilitation may become magnified in the case of overlapping trade agreements when the
applicable tariff preferences and classification, rules of origin and other trade regulations
vary across regions.  For example, consider a Sri Lankan exporter wishing to sell to India
– does he/she do business under the SAPTA rules, those of the India – Lanka agreement,
or those of APTA?  Given the information and transaction costs imposed by the complexity
of trading arrangements – which are magnified if facilitation mechanisms are weak – it is
possible that the trader will find it least costly to trade under MFN conditions and hence
will be denied the potential benefits of the regional agreements.
A number of studies have demonstrated substantial welfare gains from reductions
in transaction costs, sometimes in excess of the potential gains from tariff liberalization.
Past studies have clarified priorities for improvement in the Asian region.  An Asia-Pacific
investigation (APEC, 2000) that was restricted to border procedures, listed complexity and
lack  of  information  on  customs  regulations  as  well  as  problems  with  customs  appeals306
mechanisms as major concerns of traders.  An ARTNeT study (ESCAP, 2006) identified
a number of areas requiring improvement as a result of a private sector survey in five
countries.  These included improvement of information completeness and timely availability,
elimination  of  corrupt  official  practices,  improved  coordination  among  official  agencies,
simplification  of  documentation  requirements,  and  improvements  related  to  customs
classification and valuation procedures.  The continuing work of the WTO trade facilitation
negotiating  group  will  contribute  to  some  harmonization  of  approaches  within  Asian
regional trade agreements, although the WTO negotiations cover only a subset of facilitation
measures.  For example, the group’s work does not extend to the application of TBT and
SPS measures or rules of origin, or to infrastructural issues.
6.  Capacity-building, infrastructure and technical assistance
Numerous priorities are to be found in the areas of capacity-building and infrastructure
development,  with  the  objective  of  permitting  fuller  realization  of  the  potential  gains  of
trade liberalization.  Infrastructure can be thought of as both physical capacity (transport
networks and facilities, and communication networks, for example) and “soft” infrastructure,
which  includes  the  essential  elements  of  trade  facilitation.    Overcoming  infrastructural
deficiencies in conjunction with relevant capacity-building in institutions, processes and
people can be vital to regional trade integration and growth, and the alleviation of poverty
(Asian Development Bank, 2005).  By reducing trade and transport margins, it can intensify
comparative advantages, raise productivity and improve both international terms of trade,
together with those of rural households (Roland-Holst, 2006).  The pro-poor benefits of
infrastructure  in  the  context  of  agricultural  liberalization  are  especially  relevant  to  the
connection of rural farmers through transport and information networks and markets to
ports  –  it  will  allow  them  to  engage  in  new  trading  opportunities  opened  up  through
regional integration, not to mention in urban domestic markets where prosperity and demand
may be enhanced through trade liberalization.
Relative to their trade with the rest of the world, there is comparatively little trade
between  the  regions  of  South  Asia,  South-East  Asia  and  China  –  North-East  Asia.
Infrastructural  deficiencies  contribute  to  this  state  of  affairs,  and  overcoming  them  will
assist wider integration across Asia and spread the benefits of growth.  Trade agreements
per se may not address infrastructural issues, but infrastructural development could be
facilitated should the agreements extend to services and foreign investment.  Where trade
agreements  include  both  developing  and  developed  countries,  the  latter  may  agree  to
provide  financial,  technical  and  capacity-building  assistance  of  various  kinds.    This  is
already occurring in some instances, such as the development of soft infrastructure to
better  allow  developing  country  partners  to  achieve  effective  compliance  with  various
regulations and standards, such as rules of origin and standards associated with TBT and
SPS.
In addition to technical assistance and financing received through existing bilateral
and  international  processes,  consideration  should  be  given  to  how  the  “aid  for  trade”
mandate of the WTO Doha Round might work in concert with regional trade agreements in
Asia.  While specifics have yet to be decided, the aid for trade concept is to assist least307
developed and other developing countries to benefit from trade liberalization, by providing
aid for trade-facilitating capacity-building and trade-related infrastructure and adjustment
through new funding provided by donors.  The recommendations of the aid for trade task
force (World Trade Organization, 2006) include strengthening the processes for identifying
cross-border  and  regional  needs,  and  requesting  countries  to  consider  the  merits  and
mechanisms for establishing regional cooperation and coordination.  Arrangements already
in place for the study, negotiation and ongoing administration of regional trade agreements
could provide the opportunity to play a prioritizing and coordination role with regard to aid
for trade.
7.  Research priorities
Several areas exist where the quantitative analysis of agricultural liberalization in
the Asian and Pacific region can be enhanced and extended.  In a dynamic setting, trade
liberalization can encourage gains due to the impact of increased competition on firms and
their productivity as well as the impacts of investment flows on economic performance.
Dynamic CGE models attempt to include such phenomena, and can specify time-dependent
behavioural models for producers and consumers as well as quantify an economy’s transition
path over time due to new investment and factor accumulation.  Compared with static
CGE models, the dynamic formulations promise a more complete analysis of the impacts
of trade liberalization on economic growth and poverty reduction.
Interest is growing in the relationship between liberalization, income inequality and
poverty reduction.  Some evidence points to increased inequality resulting from economic
liberalization, but this may or may not be accompanied by reductions in the prevalence of
absolute poverty.  Work on this aspect, using both CGE models and more detailed models
of household behaviour and income distribution, is at an early stage and further progress
would be of value in informing policy makers of possible poverty-reducing approaches to
liberalization.  Global trade models can demonstrate welfare gains from trade liberalization,
but are usually silent about the adjustments costs that must be incurred in the process of
realizing  those  gains.    In  developing  countries  especially,  where  labour,  financial  and
information markets might be weak, and where underdeveloped infrastructure and education
systems impose barriers to skills improvement and regional migration, these adjustment
costs can fall disproportionately on the poorest people.
Yet another area for further research is how trade liberalization in the Asia-Pacific
agricultural sector might have an impact on the natural environment.  Will land be abandoned
or  farmed  more  or  less  intensively?    What  will  be  the  results  in  terms  of  biodiversity,
deforestation, water and air pollution, and water scarcity?
Finally, where trade models such as GTAP are used to simulate the creation of new
or expanded regional trade arrangements, further efforts can be made to ensure that the
model  structure,  parameters  and  policy  data  are  relevant  to  the  study.    For  example,
despite  the  best  efforts  of  database  creators,  the  databases  may  not  incorporate  the
appropriate base-year tariff data, which can be crucial to the evaluation of preferential
trade arrangements.308
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